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ABSTRACT
ON-CHIP TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
IN NANOMETER CMOS
February 2012
VIKRAM BELUR SURESH
B.E, VISHVESHWARIAH TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Wayne Burleson

On-chip True Random Number Generator (TRNG) forms an integral part of a number of
cryptographic systems in multi-core processors, communication networks and RFID. TRNG
provides random keys, device id and seed for Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNG).
These circuits, harnessing physical random variations like thermal noise or stray electromagnetic
waves are ideally expected to generate random bits with very high entropy and zero correlation.
But, progression to advance semiconductor manufacturing processes has brought about various
challenges in the design of TRNG. Increasing variations in the fabrication process and the
sensitivity of transistors to operating conditions like temperature and supply voltage have
significant effect on the efficiency of TRNG designed in sub-micron technologies.
Poorly designed random number generators also provide an avenue for attackers to break
the security of a cryptographic system. Process variation and operating conditions may be used
as effective tools of attack against TRNG. This work makes a comprehensive study of the effect
of process variation on metastability-based TRNG designed in deep sub-micron technology.
Furthermore, the effect of operating temperature and the supply voltage on the performance of
TRNG is also analyzed. To mitigate these issues we study entropy extraction mechanisms based
both on algorithmic approach and circuit tuning and compare these techniques based on their
tolerance to process variation and the energy overhead for correction. We combine the two
iv

approaches to efficiently perform self-calibration, using a hybrid of algorithmic correction and
circuit tuning to compensate the effect of variations. The proposed technique provides a fair
trade-off between the degree of entropy extraction and the overhead in terms of area and energy,
introducing minimal correlation in the output of the TRNG. Besides the study of the effect of
process variation and operating conditions on the TRNG, we also propose to study the possible
attack models on a TRNG. Finally, we propose a probabilistic approach to design and analysis of
TRNG using a stochastic model of the circuit operation and incorporating the random source in
thermal noise.
All analysis is done for 45nm technology using the NCSU PDK transistor models. The
simulation platform is developed using HSPICE and a Perl based automation flow.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Secure processing, communication and data transfer have been major areas of research
and development over the last decade. A number of applications ranging from complex
processing and data communication to light-weight ubiquitous applications like smart cards and
RFID depend on a secure environment for their operation. Numerous communication protocols
and cryptographic algorithms have been developed in this direction. Most of these techniques
depend on secure transfer of data based on authentication or data encryption. This has created a
need for generation of random keys or id. Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) is
frequently used to generate random keys for these purposes. Since a PRNG is algorithm based, it
is vulnerable to traditional crypto attacks as well as attacks based on Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) and Electromagnetic emissions (EM). To secure the key generation, either the algorithm
of the PRNG has to be designed to be more complex, adding to an overhead in the area and
power of the design or the PRNG seeded using a more random source. Thus, the need for design
of efficient and light weight True Random Number Generators (TRNG) is ever increasing in the
field of secure computing.
TRNG is fundamentally a circuit that extracts randomness from a physical phenomenon
having a random distribution. Unlike a PRNG, the state of a TRNG is independent of the
previous states and generates bits with entropy very close to the ideal value of '1'. A basic TRNG
circuit would consist of three components, as shown in figure 1, the source of randomness, the
extraction circuit and the post-processing unit. Cosmic rays, stray electromagnetic waves and
thermal noise are some of the potential sources of randomness. A TRNG samples and digitizes
these continuous sources to extract the randomness. The entropy may be extracted in the form of
random clock jitter samples, power up state of memory cells, meta-stability of devices and chaos
on deterministic analog signals. Due to imperfections in the source of entropy or the sample and
digitize circuit, the output of the TRNG may not have the preferred degree of randomness.
1

Figure 1. Basic TRNG system

To improve the randomness and further extract entropy, various post-processing techniques are
employed. On-chip TRNG circuits are being increasingly used in various applications to enhance
the security. “Ultra-wide band for Low Power Security”, our exploratory project funded by the
National Science Foundation, explores the application of TRNG to low power security.
Various sample and digitize circuits have been discussed in literature to extract entropy
from a random source. Optical designs have been developed to monitor the behavior of a single
photon in free space. This information is sampled using a discrete digital circuit to extract
random bits [1]. A Geiger –Mueller tube is used to detect individual radioactive disintegration.
The decay rate of atoms of radioactive material can be sampled to generate random data. Johnson
noise across a resistor can be used as a source of randomness. The amplified thermal noise is fed
to a voltage controlled oscillator, the output of which is sampled to obtain random bits [2].
Memory based designs can also be used as TRNG. The random access time in DRAM due to
collision between the memory access and the refresh cycles serve as a source of entropy [3].
Ring oscillator based TRNG and metastability-based TRNG are the most commonly used digital
designs for on-chip random number generation since these circuits directly provide a digitized
output. These circuits will be discussed in the following sections.
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1.1 Ring Oscillator based TRNG
Jitter in Ring Oscillators (RO) provides a simple and effective way to extract
randomness. RO based TRNG are popular as they can be implemented efficiently in both
ASIC/custom as well as FPGA based designs [4][5][6][7]. A ring oscillator is built using an odd
number of inverters and feeding back the output of final inverter to the input of first inverter.
Variation in power supply in the form of IR drop or supply noise causes a variation in the
inverter delays and hence the frequency of oscillation. This uncertainty of the oscillator signal
(output) in time domain is termed as Jitter. Since the jitter depends on various factors, some of
which are random, it can be used as a source of randomness in the design of an RO based
TRNG. The basic TRNG circuits use two or more ring oscillators as shown in figure 2 and XOR
the outputs. The output signal of the XOR is sampled during the transition zone to get random
values because of the jitter in the two oscillator rings.
Ring Oscillator-1

Ring Oscillator-n
10011101001111000010….

D

SET

Q
Random
bits

CLR

Ring Oscillator (Sample clock)

Figure 2. Ring oscillator based TRNG

3

Q

A

number

of

variations

of

this

idea

have

been

discussed

in

literature.

The output of a faster RO when sampled by a slower RO, whose jitter is comparable to the
period of the faster clock, generates random bits [8]. The outputs of a number of ring oscillators
can be combined using an XOR gate and sampled to obtain a stream of random bits.
The output of the XOR gate will have a spectrum of transitions, some deterministic and some
random. The deterministic transitions are caused due to the overlap of jitter between the ring
oscillators. The TRNG system is designed in such a way as to fill the spectrum with a large
number of random transitions and sample the same using an appropriate sampling signal [4].
One approach is to use oscillator rings of variable lengths. When two rings of relatively prime
length, generating clock signals of period 2T, 3T and so on are used, they produce a random
transition at time instants equal to common multiples, which in this case is 6T, 12T, 18T, etc. By
filling up the spectrum with such transitions using more than two oscillator rings and sampling
the data only at such time instants produces a stream of random bits. Yet another form of RO
based TRNG consists of a counter clocked by the output of a ring oscillator. The counter value
sampled after a number of cycles of a reference clock, can be expected to give different values in
different samples based on the random jitter in the ring oscillator [5].

1.2 Metastability based TRNG
Metastability based TRNG circuits are based on metastable circuit elements like crosscouple inverters or SRAM cells to extract randomness from thermal noise. On-chip SRAM
memory provides a very convenient technique for generating random numbers. During the
power up process, the SRAM cells restore to a stable state of either a '0' or a '1' based on the
random thermal noise present in the design, providing random bits [9]. Similarly, when both the
outputs of a cross coupled inverter pair is charged to Vdd or logic '1', the inverters are driven to a
metastable state. Upon releasing the charge, the inverters take some time to restore to a stable
state. The resolution time is a function of the thermal noise present and can be used to generate
4

random bits [10]. In modern cryptographic applications, metastability based TRNG are being
increasingly used since they are simpler to design, in some cases making use of the already
available hardware and consume less energy as compared to other TRNG circuits. Thus in this
work we focus mainly on efficiency of metastability based TRNG and the effect of process
variation and operating conditions on these circuits.
A basic metastability based TRNG, considered for this work, consists of a pair of cross
coupled inverters, figure 3. The inputs of both the inverters are pre-charged to logic HIGH,
through two PMOS transistors during the negative half cycle of the clock. Thus, both the
inverters are driven to a metastable state. During the positive half of the clock cycle, the precharge is removed and then inverters are allowed to come out of the metastable state and settle
down to a stable state. If both the inverters are identical in all respects, the random differential
thermal noise at the inputs of the inverters decides the resolution state. Hence, under an unbiased

Clk

a

INV1

b
Id1
Clk
a
b

Id2

INV2

Clk

Figure 3. Metastability based TRNG
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operating condition, thermal noise acts as the source of randomness to generate a bit '0' or a bit'1'
at each cycle.
Under matched conditions, the circuit behaves as a fair coin generating bit '0' and bit '1'
with an equal probability of 0.5, resulting in an ideal bit entropy of 1. But, in deep sub-micron
technologies, increasing variation in process and changes in the operating conditions may impact
the behavior of the TRNG. Thus, the effect of variation in the process, temperature and supply
voltage and the analysis of circuits from a cryptographic perspective is an important topic of
study in the field of design and security of on-chip random number generators.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFECT OF PROCESS VARIATION AND MITIGATION TECHNIQUES

Process variation is undoubtedly the major challenge in the evolution of CMOS
technology 45nm and below. Reducing feature sizes have imposed additional constraints on the
design and fabrication methodology. The actual fabricated feature dimensions, transistor
threshold voltages and the dopant concentrations are observed to vary more in terms of
percentage, compared to the models used in the design phase, as we move to lower technology
nodes. These factors affect the performance of the designs in terms of delay, power and
reliability.
The variations in transistor behavior may be attributed to a number of factors. Random
Dopant Fluctuation (RDF) is caused due to random variation in the dopant concentration in the
transistors. With reducing channel lengths, the number of dopant atoms is decreasing
exponentially. Hence, even a small variability in few random dopant atoms results in different
electrical characteristics of two transistors fabricated one beside the other. With the advent of
technology, the feature dimensions are decreasing at a faster rate compared to the wavelength of
the light source used for optical lithography. In 45nm fabrication process, feature sizes as small
as 45nm are fabricated using a light of wavelength 193nm. Thus each feature fabricated on the
silicon is affected by the size, shape and density of the features surrounding it. The effect seen in
the form of Line Edge Roughness (LER) and Line Width Roughness (LWR) has increased the
intra-die variations. Also, variation in the oxide thickness leads to variation in the threshold
voltage of different transistors on the same die. All these factors constitute the static variation
that is observed during the fabrication process.
Apart from the fabrication process, a number of factors that vary dynamically during the
functioning of the chip also affect the behavior of the transistors. Short channel effects like
channel length modulation, electron-migration in interconnects, NBTI and other wear out effects
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hamper the performance of deep sub-micron designs. The effect of both the static and dynamic
variations may be modeled in the form of one of the following parameters:
1. Variation in transistor length (Effective length of the channel)
2. Variation in transistor width
3. Variation in threshold voltage
One or more of these variations may impact the other parameters as well. Of these, the variation
in transistor length has the most significant effect on the behavior of the transistor.

2.1 Effect of process variation on TRNG
Variation in process affects the delay and power of a transistor. But, from a cryptographic
point of view, it is more important to analyze how these effects translate into variation in the
randomness of the TRNG. Under ideal conditions, the TRNG acts as a fair coin. The generation
of bits is solely dependent on the random differential thermal noise at the inputs of the two
inverters. But, a relative variation in the feature size or threshold voltage of the transistors in the
cross coupled inverters would lead to a bias in the circuit. Based on the mismatch, one of the
inverters will tend to be faster than the other, resulting in more zeros/ones generated at its output
as compared to the other. Unless the differential noise is strong enough to overcome this
mismatch, the TRNG would generate an output biased to either '1' or '0'. So, the probability of
the bits generated will deviate from the ideal value of 0.5, reducing the bit entropy below 1.
The degree of randomness of the bits generated by a RNG is evaluated through various
statistical tests developed by organizations like the National Institutes of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [11]. The NIST suite consists of a series of tests that focus on a variety of
different types of non-randomness that could exist in a sequence. Although the NIST tests are
necessary for validating a TRNG, the bit entropy of a sequence of bits generated, provides a
reasonable idea of the lack of randomness. The bit entropy H(X) is given by the following
equation:

8

Hence, in the following work, bit entropy is used to analyze the effect of process variation on the
TRNG.
The Metastability-based TRNG circuit discussed in the previous chapter was modeled in
HSPICE. Since the variation in the transistor length has the most significant effect on the
electrical behavior, Monte-Carlo simulations were performed for a relative 3-σ variation of 20%
between the transistor lengths of the two inverters in the design.

Figure 4. Variation of bit entropy with device mismatch [15]

The results, as shown in figure 4, indicates that the bit entropy of the TRNG output
decreases with increasing device mismatch. Thus, the TRNG cannot be effective for
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cryptographic applications when used stand alone. Correction mechanisms have to be employed
to extract additional entropy. The correction mechanism may be a traditional algorithmic postprocessing or tuning the circuit to compensate for the mismatch. Each of these approaches
presents trade-off between the energy overhead for correction and the degree of correction
achieved.

2.2 Entropy extraction using algorithmic post-processing
The entropy of the bits generated by a TRNG may be improved using a number of
algorithmic approaches, figure 5. XOR function is a very simple and commonly used correction
technique [4]. von Neumann correction is another very efficient entropy extractor that is widely
used in random number generation [2][4][8]. Apart from these, universal hash function [9] or
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) are also used for improving the randomness of TRNG.

TRNG
(biased)

11101110….

Post-processing
unit

biased output

10100110….
unbiased output

Figure
Figure5.5.TRNG
TRNGwith
withalgorithmic
algorithmicpost-processing
post-processing

XOR function:
The XOR function is a commonly used entropy extractor. When the outputs of two or
more TRNG circuits are XORed to improve the entropy of the output as shown in figure 6, the
bias in one of the circuits is masked by the other TRNG circuits. Although the XOR function
provides a simple implementation for improving the entropy of the design, it leads to overhead in
the form of multiple TRNG circuits to generate bits. From the law of averaging the
implementation would produce better results as more number of TRNG circuits are used. But,
this would lead to additional overhead in terms of area and power. Further, care should be taken
10

to place the circuits in close vicinity to avoid non common mode variation in the operating
conditions.

Figure 6. TRNG using XOR function for post-processing

von Neumann corrector:
The von Neumann corrector is the most widely used correction mechanism to enhance
the entropy of a TRNG. The von Neumann function, as shown in table 1, generates a uniform
distribution on bit „0‟ and bit „1‟. It considers simultaneous pairs of bits from the TRNG. A bit
„0‟ is generated if the TRNG bit sequence is [1,0] and a bit „1‟ is generated if the TRNG bit
sequence is [0,1]. Bit sequences [0,0] and [1,1] are discarded.

Table 1. von Neumann function for entropy extraction

11

The von Neumann corrector provides significant improvement in the entropy by
generating bits with entropy very close to the ideal value of 1. But, since some of the bit
sequences from the TRNG are discarded, the output bit rate of the von Neumann is dependent on
the TRNG output and hence not constant.

Figure 7. Variable bit rate due to von Neumann correction

Hence, a shift register has to be used to store the corrected bits and use it for further processing,
figure 8. This adds to the area and power overhead.

Figure 8. Entropy extraction using von Neumann corrector

2.3 Entropy extraction using circuit calibration
Circuit tuning mechanisms have been used in deep sub-micron technology for post
fabrication clock skew and delay tuning. Digital de-skewing circuits have been used for clock
distribution in microprocessor designs to mitigate variations and gradients to match the clock
signal between two clusters [12]. Process monitoring circuits are used to detect variations and
calibrate on-chip thermal sensors [13]. Charge injection is another way to compensate for
mismatches in the circuit [10]. Similar circuit calibration techniques may also be extended to
12

TRNG design to compensate for device mismatch due to process variation. In a publication by
Intel Corp. a two stage circuit calibration mechanism has been proposed a two stage circuit
calibration mechanism to mitigate the effect of process variation, figure 9 [14].

Figure 9. Metastability-based TRNG

The coarse grain calibration circuit, figure 10, consists of parallel PMOS and NMOS structures
in both the inverters. These act as additional source and sink paths respectively to compensate
for an increase in speed of the other inverter and hence match the two devices.

Figure 10. Coarse grain calibration [14]
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The fine grain calibration, figure 11, provides a variable delay tuning mechanism for the precharge clock. By increasing the delay on the pre-charge clock path, either one of the inputs of the
two inverters are held at logic „1‟ for longer than the other, thereby compensating for the bias
introduced due to device mismatch.

Figure 11. Fine grain calibration [14]

Once the TRNG is fabricated, bits can be generated during the chip testing process. Depending
on the bit entropy, the bias in the TRNG due to process variation is estimated. Accordingly,
appropriate configuration bits are set to perform a combination of coarse and fine grained tuning
to compensate for the bias and achieve an entropy close to „1‟.

2.4 Comparison of entropy extraction techniques
The different entropy extraction mechanisms were analyzed for the degree of
improvement in randomness achieved for varying device mismatch [15].
The XOR function, as shown in table 2, provides considerable improvement in the
entropy if one of the two TRNG used can generate bits with high entropy. But, as the device
mismatch in both the inverters increase, there is minimal improvement in the entropy obtained
through the XOR function. The bit entropy falls much below the value desired for cryptographic
applications for any device mismatch more than 3%.

14

Table 2.Bit entropy of TRNG using XOR function for correction [15]

von Neumann corrector provides a very significant improvement in the bit entropy. Since,
consecutive zeros and ones are discarded by the algorithm, non-random bits are filtered and only
the bit stream with high entropy is extracted.

Figure 12. Variation of bit entropy using von Neumann corrector [15]
15

But, with increase in device mismatch, the TRNG will be biased to either „0‟ or „1‟.
Hence, it generates the sequences [0,0] or [1,1] more frequently. As a result more number of
TRNG bits has to be generated per bit extracted from the corrector and the output bit rate of the
von Neumann corrector decreases. This results in increased energy consumption per bit.

Figure 13. Variation of bit rate and energy consumption of von Neumann corrector [15]

The circuit calibration technique is seen to provide an improvement in the entropy
comparable to the von Neumann corrector. A comparison of the bit entropy with varying device
mismatch is as shown in figure 14.

16

Figure 14. Comparison of the bias removal techniques [15]

Table 3. Energy/bit for different entropy extraction techniques [15]

An important trade-off in choosing the correction mechanism, especially for lightweight
applications like RFID is the energy overhead per random bit. Table 3 summarizes the energy
consumption per bit of the TRNG with each entropy extraction technique.
17

Although the XOR function adds to very little overhead in terms of energy, it proves to
be inefficient for increased process variation. Even with a device mismatch of 3%, the bit
entropy drops below the values expected for cryptographic applications. The von Neumann
corrector generates bits with entropy very close to „1‟. But, with increase in process variation,
more bits have to be generated by the basic TRNG per bit extracted. As a result the energy per
bit increases. The average energy per bit observed is 0.282pJ, with the maximum value crossing
1pJ/bit for variations greater than 15%.
The circuit calibration mechanism provides a good trade-off between the enhancement in
randomness and the energy overhead. It is efficient for more than 12% larger variation as
compared to the XOR function. It provides an entropy extraction comparable to that of the von
Neumann corrector but at 56% lower energy overhead. The calibration technique also provides
the flexibility of varying the number of configuration bits based on the variation expected in a
process.

Figure 15. Variation of bit entropy and energy/bit for varying number of configuration bits [15]
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With decreasing number of configuration bits, the calibration technique provides effective
correction for lesser process variation. But, accordingly the energy overhead also reduces. Hence
based on the expected process variation, fewer configuration bits may be used along with
combination of algorithmic post-processing to achieve minimal energy overhead.
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CHAPTER 3
EFFECT OF TEMPERATURE ON TRNG

Post fabrication, the operating conditions of the chip also affects the behavior of CMOS
circuits. Variation in temperature and supply voltage impacts the delay of the transistors. Apart
from this, wear out effects due to prolonged usage like Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) and Negative
Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) also degrade the performance of the devices. Unlike a
PRNG, which relies on the algorithm to generate randomness, a TRNG depends on the
performance and reliability of its circuit to generate un-bias and un-correlated output. Hence, it is
essential to study the effect of operating conditions on the entropy of the TRNG output.

3.1 Effect of temperature on MOS transistor
The drain current of an NMOS transistor is given by the following equation [16].

where
Hence, the drain current is a function of the electron mobility and the threshold voltage. Both
these parameters are functions of the operating temperature. The mobility of electrons is given
by:

20

With an increase in temperature the mobility of electrons decreases. This would lead to a
decrease in the drain current. But, the drain current is also dependent on the threshold voltage
that is give by the equation

Hence with increase in temperature, the threshold voltage of the transistor decreases aiding the
performance. But, it is observed that the net effect of increase in temperature is that the transistor
drain current decreases and hence the delay of the transistor increases.

Figure 16. Variation of NMOS drain current with temperature
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3.2 Effect of temperature on MOS transistor in the presence of process variation
For the study of Metastability based TRNG, the relative mismatch in the transistor
parameters of the two cross coupled inverters is more significant than the absolute process
variation. On similar lines, the relative effect of operating conditions on the transistors is of
greater concern than the absolute effect. Thus, it is important to analyze the effect of variation of
temperature for transistors with different channel lengths. The BSIM4 model indicates that as
channel length decreases, the threshold voltage shows a greater dependence on the channel
length due to Short Channel Effect (SCE) and Drain Induced Barrier Lowering (DIBL). The
change in Vth due to SCE and DIBL is modeled as [17]

The short-channel effect coefficient has a strong dependence on the channel length given by

The temperature dependence of threshold voltage is given by the equation
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Hence, with decreasing channel length, the short-channel effect coefficient increases. Thus, the
change in Vth is larger. So, the net effect of decreasing mobility and decreasing threshold voltage
will vary for transistors of different channel lengths. Transistors with shorter channel length may
be expected to have a smaller reduction in drain current with increasing temperature because of a
larger decrease in the threshold voltage.
Simulations were performed for varying transistor lengths and operating temperature by
modeling in HSPICE. The drain current measured in each scenario is normalized against the
drain current at 0oC, which as expected is the largest.

Figure 17. Variation of drain current of NMOS of different channel length with increase in
temperature

The results, as shown in figure 17, indicate that transistors with longer channel length have a
steeper slope of drain current reduction. This result reinforces the analytical reasoning provided
earlier based on BSIM model equations. Hence, with decreasing channel length, the rate of
decrease of drain current, with increase in temperature, is slower. Thus, for two transistors with
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mismatch in device lengths, the relative difference between the transistor delays can be expected
to increase with increase in temperature.

3.3 Effect of temperature on TRNG
The plots of drain current of two NMOS transistors with different mismatches at varying
temperature are shown in figure 18. It is evident that, with greater mismatch, the difference in drain
currents of the two transistors increases at a greater rate with increase in temperature.
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Figure 18: Rate of decrease in drain current for different values of device mismatch

To study the effect of temperature on the TRNG in the presence of process variation, the TRNG
modeled in SPICE was simulated for varying temperature values and random variation in transistor
lengths. Hamming distance between bits generated at different temperature corners is an effective metric
used to analyze the effect of temperature. The results below represent the hamming distance of sequences
of 16bits generated at different temperatures as compared to the bits generated at 0oC.

24

10

11

600

Mismatch = 0.54nm

Mismatch = 0nm

600

Number of occurences

Number of occurences

700

20degC

500

40degC

400

60degC

300

80degC

200

100degC

100

500
20degC
400

40degC

300

60degC
80degC

200

100degC
100
0

0
0

0

1
2
3
4
5
Hamming Distance/16 bits for different
temperatures (oC)

1

2

3

4

5

Hamming Distance/16 bits for different
temperatures (oC)

Figure 19: Hamming distance compared with TRNG at 0oC
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Figure 20: Hamming distance compared with TRNG at 0oC
The variation in hamming distance indicates that the statistics of the TRNG change with change
in temperature. This directly translates into a change in the bit entropy. With increasing temperature, the
bit entropy of the TRNG decreases. But, designs with greater mismatch are observed to have a steeper
reduction in bit entropy. Hence, temperature has a greater impact on TRNG with larger device mismatch.
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3.4 Effect of power supply noise on the behavior of the TRNG
Similar to temperature, noise on the power supply can also affect the performance and
behavior of circuits. In specific, for high performance designs, power supply noise can impact the delay
of the cells and cause timing failures. Since metastability based TRNG is highly sensitive to difference in
delay of the transistors, it is important to analyze the behavior of the TRNG in the presence of power
supply noise.
To study the effect of supply noise, the TRNG was simulated for random device mismatches
and a power supply noise of 5% of VDD at 200MHz. Hamming distance for sequences of 16 bits was
calculated comparing with a TRNG with stable power supply. The results indicate that power supply
noise does not have a significant impact on the statistics of the TRNG. While designs with minimal
device mismatch are robust against supply noise and designs with large device mismatches are already
too biased to see any effect of power supply noise. A slight variation in the bit distribution is observed in
designs which have mismatch ranging from 2-6%.
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Figure 22: Hamming distance of bits compared with TRNG with stable power supply
The effect of supply noise on the entropy is negligibly small and has no noticeable trend across varied
device mismatches.

As discussed in the previous chapter, circuit calibration techniques can be employed to
mitigate the effect of process variation. But, a one-time tuning at the testing stage does not
resolve the problem of effect of temperature on the design. Any calibration performed at the
testing stage can only account for the process variation at the testing temperature. Any variation
in temperature during the chip operation will again bias the TRNG.
Hence, a dynamic self-calibration mechanism has to be used to mitigate the effect of
temperature variation. The TRNG circuit also needs to be analyzed for the effect of fluctuations
in supply voltage and the impact of wear out effects like HCI and NBTI/PBTI.
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CHAPTER 4

SUB-VDD PRECHARGE TECHNIQUE

One of the ways to improve the randomness of the TRNG and the effectiveness of postprocessing techniques is to make the TRNG circuit inherently more stable against device
mismatch. Traditional correction techniques for a biased TRNG include post-Si tuning or
algorithmic post-processing. Post-Si tuning uses additional transistors to compensate for the
mismatch of the devices. The algorithmic post-processing techniques do not modify the TRNG
circuit; but, they extract randomness out of the biased bits generated by the raw TRNG circuit.
Here we explore a sub-vdd precharge technique to reduce the effect of intra-die variation on the
entropy of the TRNG.
4.1 Effect of pre-charge on TRNG bias

A closer study of the TRNG circuit shows that when the pre-charge is released, both the pull
down NMOS transistors of the inverters enter the saturation mode. The basic saturation current
equation (neglecting the short channel effects) is given by [21],

Equating the constants to a value “β” and adding a random variable for thermal noise at the gate,

For the metastability based TRNG circuit, the drain current of the two pull down NMOS devices,
once the pre-charge is released, is given by,
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Figure 23: Cross-coupled inverters

Under ideal conditions, when the NMOS devices are perfectly matched, Idsat1 = Idsat2 for
Vnoise1 = Vnoise2. In other words, the state of the TRNG is resolved based only on the
differential thermal noise Δnoise = Vnoise1 - Vnoise2 . If the NMOS devices are mismatched
due to random local variation, the bias in the TRNG can be represented by the difference in the
saturation currents at zero differential thermal noise. Thus, for a biased TRNG,

Larger the mismatch, larger will be the difference in the currents and hence the bias in the
TRNG.
Case 1: Mismatch in NMOS width/length:
In context of a mismatch in the device feature size (width or length) with constant Vt, the
difference in the NMOS currents is given by,
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Equation (6) indicates that the mismatch in the NMOS devices is magnified by the factor
. Since, Vnoise is a random variable and cannot be controlled, for a given
device type ( Typical/High/Low Vt), the effect of device mismatch can be reduced by lowering
the Vgs. Hence, a lower pre-charge voltage can alleviate the effect of process variation.
Considering the short channel effect of variation in length on the threshold voltage [21],

where, ΔVth is the change in threshold due to Short Channel Effect (SCE) or Drain Induced
Barrier Lowering (DIBL); θth(Leff) is the short channel effect coefficient; Vbi is the built-in
junction voltage; and Vds is the drain-source voltage. In the cross-coupled inverter, the gate
voltage of one inverter is the drain-source voltage of the pull down device of the other inverter.
Hence, a lower pre-charge voltage reduces the impact of SCE/DIBL effects on the transistors.
This further minimizes the degree of mismatch between the NMOS devices.
Case 2: Mismatch in NMOS threshold voltages:
For a mismatch in the threshold voltages of the pull down transistors of the TRNG, the bias,
represented as the difference in the saturation currents is,

Equation (9) also shows that a reduced Vgs due to sub-Vdd pre-charge can decrease the impact
of mismatch on the bias of the TRNG.
A similar analysis performed with variation in both width/length and threshold voltages also
indicates that a lower pre-charge alleviates the impact of intra-die variation on the statistics of
the TRNG. Thus, sub-Vdd pre-charge makes the TRNG more robust to variability in fabrication
30

process. Since only the pre-charge voltage is reduced and not the supply voltage, the technique
does not impact the performance of the TRNG. However it should be noted that the proposed
technique only reduces the pre-charge voltage to less than Vdd, but does not operate the TRNG
circuit in sub-threshold mode.
4.2 Effect of process variation on TRNG offset voltage

To further validate the hypothesis that lower pre-charge voltage minimizes the effect of intra-die
variation, the cross coupled inverter circuit was simulated with varying amount of device
mismatch. In fig. 3, if the pull down NMOS N1 is faster than N2, then I1 > I2 for V(a) = V(b).
But, for a large enough ΔV=V(b)-V(a), I1 = I2. This is the differential voltage required to negate
the mismatch and equalize the pull down currents. From the transistor current equation (6), it is
evident that a larger mismatch will require a greater differential voltage to overcome the
difference in the currents. A plot of the differential voltage required to equalize the pull down
currents of cross coupled inverters for varying degree of device mismatch is as shown in fig. 4.

Output trip for
large enough
V(b)-V(a)

b
a

Figure 24: Effect of increasing differential voltage on biased TRNG
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The plot shows that for a pre-charge voltage of 1.1V (Vdd) and a device mismatch of 5%, the
differential voltage required to nullify the variation is 53mV. For the same mismatch and a precharge voltage of 0.75V, the differential voltage required is 34mV. This is because the lower precharge voltage results in a lower Vgs for the pull down transistors and from equation (6), this
minimizes the difference in drain currents. Hence, a smaller differential voltage is sufficient to
overcome the mismatch.
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Figure 25: Analysis of differential voltage to compensate mismatch

For metastability based TRNG, the differential thermal noise at the two pre-charged
nodes decide the output state. For instance, a TRNG biased (at node b, fig. 1) to 0 with P(0)=0.7
and P(1) = 0.3 implies that the pull down transistor N1 is faster than N2 or the current Id1 > Id2.
The output is resolved to a '1' only when the differential thermal noise ΔV=V(b)-V(a) is large
enough to overcome the mismatch and induce a scenario where Id2 > Id1. Hence, fig. 4 also
indicates the differential thermal noise required by the TRNG to overcome the mismatch and
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generate a random bit, for varying device mismatch and pre-charge voltage. Assuming that the
thermal noise at the nodes 'a' and 'b' are independent and each have a Gaussian distribution with
mean µnoise and a variance σnoise, the differential noise also has Gaussian distribution with mean
'0' and variance 2σnoise.Hence, a smaller differential noise occurs with a greater probability as
compared to a large differential noise, figure 26. It is clear that the probability of differential
noise required to nullify the intra-die variation is higher when the pre-charge voltage is lower.
For a 2% device mismatch, the probability of the differential thermal voltage to compensate the
variation at 0.7V pre-charge is ~2X the probability in case of 1.1V (Vdd) pre-charge. Thus, for a
TRNG biased to '1', the probability of the output node resolving to a '0' increases with decreasing
pre-charge voltage. In other words, the randomness of the TRNG increases for lower pre-charge
voltages.

2σnoise
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2σnoise

20mV

0

µnoise

µnoise
Figure 26: Distribution of thermal noise
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30mV

4.3 Implementation and results with sub-vdd pre-charge

The pre-charge circuit is designed using pull down load on the pre-charge paths as shown
in figure 27. Either NMOS or PMOS devices can be used to reduce the pre-charge from the
nominal Vdd value of '1.1V'. Based on the device used, different amounts of reduction in precharge are obtained. Figure 28 shows the voltage drop obtained due to NMOS and PMOS pull
down devices of different sizes.

For a constant device width, NMOS load provides larger drop and hence a lower pre-charge
voltage as compared to PMOS. A 0.25u wide NMOS device can pull down the pre-charge
voltage of 1.1 by ~400mV. This creates an effective pre-charge voltage of 0.7V instead of Vdd
(1.1V). Hence, NMOS load is used to provide a coarse control of the pre-charge voltage, while
the PMOS devices can be used for finer control. The loads on the pre-charged nodes are
controlled by the clock signals. As a result the load is active only during the duration of precharge and is turned OFF when the TRNG evaluates the state. This reduces short circuit leakage
and also does not have any impact on the resolution of stable state of the TRNG.
The above results indicate that operating the TRNG at a lower pre-charge voltage should
improve the randomness and hence the entropy of the bits generated. Figure 29 shows the plot of
bit entropy of the TRNG with varying device mismatch for different pre-charge voltages. With
increasing device mismatch, operating the TRNG with a lower pre-charge voltage results in
better entropy. This makes the TRNG more tolerant to process variation. Since only the precharge voltage is reduced and not the supply voltage, there is no impact on the performance of
the TRNG.
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Thus, using a sub-vdd pre-charge voltage makes the TRNG more robust to process
variation. However, the sub-vdd pre-charge technique by itself cannot enhance the entropy of the
TRNG by enough to be used for cryptographic applications. But, a TRNG with inherently better
bit entropy feeding a post-processing unit can be expected to be more robust that a TRNG with
traditional Vdd pre-charge. Further, this technique only reduces the pre-charge time, but has no
impact on the evaluation time of the TRNG, which limits the TRNG circuit performance.
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CHAPTER 5

HYBRID SELF-CALIBRATION TECHNIQUE FOR ENTROPY EXTRACTION

A number of circuit calibration techniques have been proposed in literature to compensate
for variability. X. Li et al. have proposed an adaptive post-silicon tuning method for analog
circuits in [23]. A digital calibration technique for analog circuits, using programmable capacitor
stack is described in [3]. One of the most prominent tuning techniques for digital circuits has
been Adaptive Body Biasing (ABB). ABB is employed to vary body bias to control the threshold
voltage of transistors and hence compensate for variation due to fabrication process [24][25]. S.
Bijansky et al. have proposed the use of variable supply voltages to improve parametric yield of
designs in [26]. Variable delay buffers have also been extensively used to tune the delay on
paths, primarily the clock paths. These provide a flexible solution to configure the buffer
strengths based on the degree of process variation [27]. The variable delay tuning techniques
may be implemented both in the form of tuning at the testing phase or online automatic/adaptive
tuning [28]. Apart from the generic data paths and clock paths, special on-chip circuitry like
sense amplifiers, sensors and detectors are also susceptible to variation in manufacturing process
and operating conditions. Along with performance, the reliability of these circuits is also affected
by variability. Sense amplifier performance and yield degrade with increasing device mismatch,
thereby affecting the performance of on-chip cache [29]. B. Dutta et al.[30] have proposed
calibration of thermal sensors using process monitors to increase the robustness of the sensors in
the presence of variation. With the increasing use of hardware cryptographic primitives in
various applications, on-chip TRNGs, designed in advance technology nodes are also affected by
variation in process and operating conditions.
Circuit calibration is a very effective technique to mitigate the effect of process variation.
But, calibration performed during chip testing has some disadvantages. Chip testing is one of the
most expensive steps in the VLSI design and fabrication process. The time duration of testing
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governs the chip testing cost. Hence, calibrating the TRNG at the testing phase is not a cost
effective solution for low cost designs like RFID. Calibration at the testing phase does not
provide a dynamic extraction mechanism. As a result, any variation in the operating conditions
cannot be compensated on the fly. Further, wear out effects like Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) and
Negative/Positive Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI/PBTI) cannot be corrected. Hence, an
efficient self-calibration mechanism has to be developed to ensure a cost effective and dynamic
approach to entropy extraction.
In [18], Srinivasan et. al have proposed a self-calibration technique. The calibration
circuit is similar to the one in [14] and consists of coarse and fine grain calibration steps. A state
machine is implemented to continuously monitor the output of the TRNG. On power up, the
coarse calibration is activated to account for the large mismatch in the cross-coupled inverter.
Once two bit flips are observed at the output of the TRNG, the control enters into the fine-grain
calibration. Here the delay on the pre-charge clock is continuously varied based on the output bit
of the TRNG. The self-calibration technique incurs additional overhead in the implementation
of the control logic. Further, the configuration process is performed every cycle of the TRNG
operation. Hence, the configuration bits are switched every cycle. This leads an overhead in
energy that may be expensive for applications like RFIDs and sensor nodes. Continuous
calibration increases the correlation between bits generated since the bias is continuously
modified based on the previous output. Although a bit-entropy ~1 is achieved, increased
correlation will weaken the statistics of the TRNG.
To overcome these short comings, we propose a hybrid self-calibration technique that
incorporates a combination of coarse level tuning using adaptive circuit calibration and a static
entropy extraction using algorithmic techniques to compensate for finer mismatch.
5.1 Proposed hybrid self-calibration technique
The results from the initial study of comparison of various entropy extraction
techniques are as shown in figure 30. The results indicate that algorithmic technique like XOR
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function and von Neumann correction are efficient for device mismatches of upto 2%. These
techniques incur lesser overhead in terms of energy and implementation. Further, they do not
increase the correlation of the bits generated by the TRNG. Hence, we explore a hybrid selfcalibration technique where the circuit is initially calibrated using additional transistors to
overcome the coarse mismatch between the devices and operate the TRNG in a region equivalent
to 2% device mismatch. Then, the adaptive coarse calibration is stopped and an algorithmic
technique like XOR function or von Neumann corrector is used to provide continuous static
entropy extraction.
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Figure 30: Effectiveness of algorithmic technique for smaller mismatch

The hybrid self-calibration technique is implemented as shown in figure 31. Since both
the nodes “a” and “b” of the TRNG are pre-charged to Vdd each cycle, the mismatch in the pull
down devices is seen to have a more significant impact than the mismatch in the pull up devices.
Hence, we provide parallel NMOS devices which can be configured match the pull down current
in the cross coupled inverters. The output of the TRNG is monitored by a control logic that
configures the additional pull down transistors till output of the TRNG flips twice. At this stage
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the TRNG is compensated for large variations and the bit distribution enters the highlighted
region, close to the ideal value of 50%. The control logic stops the coarse calibration.
The calibrated TRNG can be fed to an entropy extractor using XOR function or von
Neumann corrector. The XOR function and von Neumann correctors provide near ideal entropy
if the TRNG circuit feeding them is calibrated to operate in a region close to the ideal scenario.
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Figure 33: Algorithmic post-processing for finer entropy extraction

5.2 Implementation and results
The proposed self-calibration technique was implemented using 45nm NCSU PDK. The
TRNG circuit along with the configurable transistors was simulated in HSPICE on a Perl based
platform. The control logic was described in verilog and synthesized using Synopsys Design
Compiler. The results indicate that the coarse grain self-calibration compensates for the
variability to a large extent by enhancing the bit entropy to values greater than 0.95. The stand
alone circuit calibration is observed to be more effective for large device mismatches due to the
coarse level of tuning.
The hybrid method of algorithmic post-processing applied in conjunction with selfcalibration, makes the TRNG circuit more robust against process variation. The design with two
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TRNG circuits, with initial self-calibration followed by an XOR of their outputs almost nullifies
device mismatch. The values of bit entropy remain consistently around the ideal value of „1‟ for
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Figure 34: Entropy extraction with hybrid self-calibration

a wide range of intra-die variation. A similar approach with a self calibrated TRNG feeding a
von Neumann corrector also completely mitigates the effect of variability on the performance of
the TRNG. A plot of the bit rate of the TRNG with the stand alone von Neumann correction and
the hybrid self-calibration shows a steady bit rate even for device mismatches as large as 10%.
This facilitates the design of high speed cryptographic systems using hardware primitives
designed in the latest technology node.
Apart from process variation, the hybrid calibration technique also improves the
reliability of the TRNG circuit in varying operating conditions. An analysis of the proposed
technique across varying temperature for different degree of device mismatches shows are as
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shown in fig 8. The results clearly show that the behavior of the TRNG is maintained even in the
presence of device mismatch and varying thermal profiles.
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Figure 35: Robustness of hybrid self-calibration against variation in temperature

The self-calibration technique does add an overhead both in terms of area and energy.
The area of the control logic is 128um2, which is negligibly small compared to the modern
processors and cryptographic cores. Since the self calibration logic operates only during the
initial cycles, till the output bit flips for the first time, it only contributes to the overhead power
in the form of static power in the long run. The static power of the control logic was estimated to
be 819.08nW. This translates into 0.82 fJ/bit for a TRNG operating at 1Gbps with a worst case
overall energy per bit of 0.5pJ/bit.
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5.3 Hybrid self-calibration with sub-vdd pre-charge

Although lower pre-charge voltage, described in the previous chapter, improves the
tolerance of the TRNG to process variation, the entropy values obtained still do not qualify the
TRNG to be used for cryptographic applications. Hence the TRNG is corrected using the hybrid
self-calibration technique. The results indicate that using a lower pre-charge further enhances the
effectiveness of hybrid self-calibration technique. This is due to the fact that the underlying
TRNG circuit operation is more robust and hence the self-calibration technique provides a much
better improvement in entropy as compared to the traditional pre-charge technique.
The results as shown in figure 37 for self-calibration using XOR function and figure 38
for self-calibration using von Neumann function further establish that pre-charging the TRNG to
a lower voltage improves the entropy.
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Figure 37: Comparison of hybrid self-calibration with different pre-charge voltages (XOR function)
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Figure 38: Comparison of hybrid self-calibration with different pre-charge voltages (von Neumann
function)
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In this chapter we propose a hybrid self-calibration technique that utilizes circuit
calibration to correct coarse mismatches in the cross-coupled inverters to operate the TRNG in a
near ideal scenario. Then, algorithmic technique is used to further correct the mismatch and
extract entropy without introducing any correlation in the bits. The control logic used for coarse
calibration is active only during the power up of the TRNG and hence contributes only to
leakage power in the long run. The hybrid self-calibration is further incorporated with sub-vdd
pre-charge technique to further enhance the randomness of the TRNG output.
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CHAPTER 6
ATTACK MODELS FOR TRNG

Study of attack models forms a very crucial area in the field of security. For a
cryptographic system extracting keys or id from a TRNG, the TRNG could potential be a single
point of attack to weaken the entire system. Hence, it is important to analyze the possible
vulnerabilities of TRNG and design techniques to mitigate the same.
Traditional PRNG have been broken and various algorithms for the same have been
published [19][32]. A PRNG can be subjected to non-invasive attacks, where the attacker
monitors the output of the PRNG and tries to determine the sequences that may be generated by
cryptanalysis of the observed data. This is possible since a PRNG is algorithm based and
consecutive states or bits of a PRNG are not completely independent. A weak LFSR may be
broken by a sheer brute force attack using the immense computational resources available today.
PRNG may also be subjected to the modern forms of attacks based on Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) or Electro-Magnetic emissions (EM). Apart from the simple LFSR based PRNG
design, a number of secure PRNG algorithms are used in real-world crypto systems. Some of
these are ANSI X9.17 PRNG, the DSA PRNG, the RSAREF PRNG and CryptoLib. These
algorithms have also been demonstrated to be vulnerable to cryptanalytic attacks. In [32], a study
of cryptanalytic attacks on these real-world PRNG has been demonstrated. The PRNG circuits
may be subjected more complex attacks like a) Direct Cryptanalytic Attack, b) Input-Based
Attacks and c) State Compromise Extension Attacks. These attacks are limited by the
computational resources available to an attacker.
An ideal TRNG on the other hand cannot be attacked using a non-invasive method since
it is unbiased and there exists no correlation between the bits generated. Any form of brute force
technique becomes near impossible for large key lengths of the order of 128 bits. But, the
efficiency of a TRNG circuit depends on factors like fabrication process and operating
conditions. Variation in these factors, either naturally or as introduced by an attacker can degrade
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the performance of the TRNG from a cryptographic sense. So, these factors provide avenue for
an attacker to either utilize the existing imperfection in the design or introduce the same to
reduce the randomness of the bits generated. Attacks have been demonstrated using simple noninvasive technique like frequency injection can make the RO based TRNG on real EMV card
deterministic [20]. The different factors that may have implications on the attack of a TRNG are
discussed below.

6.1 Process variation
Variation in the fabrication process is one of the major factors affecting the performance
of the TRNG. Mismatch in the parameters of the transistors in the form of channel length or
width and differences in threshold voltage (Vth) bias the TRNG to generate bits of one polarity
with a greater probability than the other. If this variation is uncompensated, the key or id space
of the TRNG bits generated is reduced. This would help an attacker to model the output of the
TRNG based on the probability of the bits generated.

Figure 39. Distribution of 8-bit key for ideal TRNG
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Figure 40. Distribution of 8-bit key for TRNG with 2% device mismatch

The plots show that in the presence of process variation, the probability of occurrence of some 8bit key sequence is significantly more that of others. Although an attacker might have no control
over this factor in most cases, there are possibilities of tampering the circuit at the fabrication
stage. Even a minute mismatch in the structure of the transistors in the inverters could reduce the
entropy of the bits generated by a large number.

6.2 Operating temperature
Temperature affects the delay of transistors by changing in charge mobility and threshold
voltage. The effect of temperature is observed to be different for transistors of different channel
lengths. This effect can be utilized by an attacker to increase bias in a TRNG. Any postprocessing technique can only increase the entropy of a TRNG. It may not be possible to
converge on the ideal value of „1‟. Thus, by increasing the temperature, an attacker can increase
the difference in the delays of the inverters and hence increase the bias. The temperature may be
increased through external sources or by activating on-chip circuits like a ring oscillator.
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Figure 41. Distribution of 8-bit key for TRNG with 2% device mismatch operating at 25oC

Figure 42. Distribution of 8-bit key for TRNG with 2% device mismatch operating at 100oC

The key distribution plots for 25oC and 100oC for a TRNG with 2% device mismatch show that
with increase in temperature, the uniformity in distribution of random bit sequences decrease. As
a result, it becomes easier for an attacker to model the TRNG and predict its outputs. A more
evident metric is the byte entropy of 128-bit keys generated from the output of the TRNG at the
two temperatures. The table clearly indicates a loss in byte entropy as temperature is increased.
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Table 4. variation of byte entropy with increase in temperature

Byte entropy for
8-bits
Byte entropy for
128-bits

TRNG with 2%
mismatch at
25oC
6.0326

TRNG with 2%
mismatch at
100oC
5.6640

96.5223

90.6254

6.3 Varying Supply voltage
The TRNG circuit involves some delay for both nodes to be pre-charged once a bit is
generated. Similarly, there is a delay involved in resolving to stable state once the cross-coupled
inverter enters a meta-stable state. This evaluation time is dependent on the differential thermal
noise at the two nodes of the TRNG. Larger the differential, smaller will be the evaluation time.
A plot of variation of evaluation time with varying differential noise is as shown in figure 43.
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Figure 43: Variation of evaluation time with differential noise
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The evaluation time is also a function of the supply voltage since a lower supply voltage
increases the delay of the cross-coupled inverters to stabilize. In other words, the gain of the
cross-coupled inverter decreases with decreasing operating voltage. Figure 44 shows the
variation of pre-charge and evaluation time with variation in supply voltage. As the supply
voltage is decreased, there is a small increase observed in the pre-charge time. But, the increase
in evaluation time with decrease in supply voltage is significant.
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Figure 44: Variation of pre-charge and evaluation time with supply voltage

The above observation indicates that the performance of the TRNG can be controlled by
an attacker by controlling the power supply voltage. The device sizing in the TRNG circuit is
performed in accordance with the target operating frequency or the bit rate. The pre-charge and
evaluation part of the clock cycle are just enough to meet the delay of the circuit. By decreasing
the voltage an attacker can increase the evaluation time, keeping the clock rate constant. Figure
45 shows the variation of evaluation time with decreasing supply voltage.
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Figure 45: Variation of evaluation time with decreasing operating voltage

In a circuit optimized to operate at a specific frequency, by decreasing the power supply
voltage, an attacker can cause incorrect bit read at the output of the TRNG. Figure 46 shows one
of the output nodes of a TRNG designed to operate at 1GHz. With decreasing supply voltage, the
evaluation time of the TRNG increases beyond a point where the pre-charge phase starts in
between the evaluation. This causes the output of that node to be wrongly read as a one instead
of a zero. Since the evaluation time of the TRNG is also a function of the differential noise, not
all bits may be erroneous.

Figure 46: Erroneous bit due to reduced supply voltage
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Figure 47 shows the variation in bit entropy for a TRNG under reduced supply voltage attack. It
is seen that the bit entropy decreases rapidly as the supply voltage is reduced beyond 0.85V.
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Figure 47: Variation of entropy with decreased power supply voltage

6.3.1 Detection of attack
An attack of the sort discussed above where the entropy of the TRNG is compromised by
an active attack can be detected by feeding the output both of the nodes of the TRNG to an
XOR/XNOR gate. It should be observed that according to the previous discussion, only a bit
zero can be erroneously read as a bit one. But, in a TRNG the two nodes generate
complementary bits. Hence, if one of the bits is driven to zero under a non-attack mode, the other
node has to be driven to a stable state of one. Under an attack scenario, both nodes are seen to
generate a bit “1” (or a bit “0” if the inverted outputs are read). Hence, by feeding both the nodes
to an XOR/XNOR gate, an attack scenario can be detected.
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6.3.2 Prevention of attack: asymmetric duty cycle
The results in figure 44 indicated that the pre-charge time of the TRNG is significantly
lower than the evaluation time. Further, the pre-charge time is dependent only on the supply
voltage. At 1.1V, the pre-charge time is 40ps. This value increases to 166ps for a supply voltage
of 0.75V. Hence, a TRNG operating at 1GHz with a 50-50 ON-OFF duty cycle provides the
entire negative half cycle of 500ps for the pre-charge phase. This provides enough margin for the
pre-charge, some of which can be utilized for the evaluation phase to protect the TRNG from
power supply reduction attack.

Figure 48: Voltage scaling attack prevention using asymmetric duty cycle clock

Figure 48 shows the effect of varying the duty cycle. The evaluation sequence is provided
with more margin even if the supply voltage is reduced to 0.75V by keeping the clock signal
high for 700ps in a 1ns clock. The variation in duty cycle is limited by the pre-charge delay. The
effect of varying the duty cycle to protect the TRNG is shown in figure 49. For a 80-20 ON-OFF
duty cycle, the TRNG is resistant to voltage scaling attack for upto 0.8V.
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Figure 49: Bit entropy of TRNG with asymmetric duty cycle

6.4 Varying duty cycle of clock
Varying the duty cycle to favor the evaluation time was shown as one of the possible
techniques to protect the TRNG against attacks. On similar lines, an attacker can control the
clock signal to the TRNG to vary the duty cycle of the clock to decrease the evaluation period. In
such a scenario, the TRNG may generate erroneous bits when the evaluation delay is close to the
period of the positive cycle of clock. Figure 50 shows the impact of variation in duty cycle on the
randomness of the output of the TRNG. Beyond a 35-65 ON-OFF duty cycle, the bit entropy
decreases significantly. The TRNG can be protected against a varying duty cycle attack by
providing enough margin using larger inverters or additional PMOS devices to increase the gain
of the cross-coupled inverter.
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Figure 50: Attack on TRNG by varying clock duty cycle

6.5 Crosstalk
Designs are getting denser as more transistors are packed in smaller area. This has
increased the number of interconnects in the design. Reduced spacing between interconnects and
increasing height of the metal layers has increased the effect of cross talk. For a meta-stability
based TRNG, that is highly sensitive to any mismatch, cross talk could act as a potential mode of
attack. The Predictive Technology Models estimate a coupling capacitance 0.054fF for two nets
running parallel with minimum DRC spacing with a length of 1μm. The simulation results
indicate that crosstalk can be used to introduce bias in the TRNG and disrupt the bit distribution,
figure 51.
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Figure 51. Distribution of 8-bit key for an ideal TRNG with crosstalk attack

6.6 Impact of attack on TRNG
Although TRNG can be a single point of failure for the entire crypto system, variation in
fabrication process and hence the bias in TRNG is inevitable. Depending on the application,
there could be a trade-off between the degree of randomness achieved (bit-entropy) and the over
in the form of area and energy to achieve the same. Complex hashing and ciphers lead to
significant overhead when compared to the negligibly small design of metastability-based
TRNG. Simpler algorithmic post-processing techniques like XOR function and von Neumann
corrector may not provide a near-1 entropy under all situations. Hence, t is imperative to analyze
the impact of reduction in bit-entropy on the security of the system.

Table 5: Variation of byte-entropy with bit-entropy

Entropy
1
0.999
0.99
0.9
0.8

8bit
8
7.99
7.92
7.20
6.40

16bit
16
15.99
15.84
14.40
12.80

32bit
32
31.98
31.68
28.80
25.61
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64bit
64
63.95
63.36
57.61
51.21

128bit
128
127.91
126.73
115.21
102.42

Table 5 shows the byte-entropy for various key-sizes with reducing bit entropy. As the bit
entropy decreases, the number of effective bits in keys/seeds generated from the TRNG also
decreases. For instance, for a bit entropy of 0.9, a 128-bit key generated from the biased TRNG
is equivalent to a 115 bit key. In other words, for an attacker, the effort required to break the 128
bit key is equivalent to the effort required to break a 115 bit key. This is due to the bias in the
TRNG. A table for the size of the key space for the same biased TRNG is as shown in table 6.

Table 6: Key space with varying bit entropy

Entropy
1
0.999
0.99
0.9
0.8

8bit
256
254.9664
242.2833
147.1066
84.52233

16bit
65536
65007.87
58701.19
21640.36
7144.024

32bit
4.29E+09
4.23E+09
3.45E+09
4.68E+08
51037080

64bit
1.84E+19
1.79E+19
1.19E+19
2.19E+17
2.6E+15

128bit
3.4E+38
3.19E+38
1.41E+38
4.81E+34
6.78E+30

Although the bias in the TRNG reduces the effective bit size of a 128 bit key by 13 bits,
the effective key space for an attacker is still 4.8e34. This is an enormously significant number in
terms of the computation power required to break the key by brute force. Since process variation
or variation operating temperature only increase the bias in the TRNG and not the correlation,
the problem of breaking a 128 bit key wil still not be simplified for an attacker even of the
TRNG is slightly biased. From [33], 84 bit is proven to be the threshold for secure key size
selection. Hence, as long as the bias in the TRNG does not reduce the effective key size of a 128
bit key to below 80, the bias may be assumed to be tolerable. For large key sizes, correlation
between bits of the TRNG assist the attacker more, as compared to bias in the bit stream
generated. On the other hand, a 64-bit key is effectively reduced to 51 bits due to bias. This
reduces the computation required by an attacker to brute force the protocol using bits from the
biased TRNG. The above study provides an outlook into entropy-energy trade-offs in designing
secure TRNG circuits based on the need of the application.
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CHAPTER 7
STOCHASTIC MODEL FOR METASTABILITY BASED TRNG

A major challenge in design and analysis of circuits in sub-micron technologies is
modeling the effect of random variations and noise. Although this can be done in HSPICE using
specific Gaussian functions, a large number of sample s are required to accurately quantify the
randomness of the TRNG output across various process corners. Although most analysis are
performed for the worst case process variation, an estimate of the expected entropy assists in
fault tolerance by choosing an appropriate post-processing technique or calibration. In this
section we introduce a stochastic model for metastability based TRNG which incorporates the
transistor current equations along with probabilistic description for thermal noise. The model
will then be extended to analyze the effect of intra-die variation on the statistics of the TRNG
followed by the impact of post-processing for various degree of device mismatch.

7.1 Thermal Noise in an isolated NMOS transistor
D

Ids
G
S

The drain current of an NMOS, working in saturation mode, is given by
–
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(7.1)

In saturation mode, the drain current is governed by the gate-source voltage. Hence, any thermal
noise on the gate terminal impacts the current through the transistor. Let Vnoise be a random
variable defining the thermal noise at the gate terminal of the transistor. Vnoise has a Gaussian
distribution with mean, μnoise and variance, σ2noise .
(7.2)

The gate-source voltage considering thermal noise is given by
(7.3)

For a constant Vgs the gate-source voltage V‟gs also has a Gaussian distribution with

(7.4)

Consider a variable,
Then, X also has a Gaussian distribution with

(7.5)
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7.2 Probabilistic analysis of Metastability based TRNG

CLK

a

b
N1

I2

I1

N2

Figure 52: TRNG circuit with pull down currents

In metastability based TRNG, the NMOS devices in the cross-coupled inverters govern the
output bit of the TRNG. The PMOS transistors help in retaining the state once the bit is sampled.
Hence, the following mathematical formulation considers only the effect of the NMOS devices.
From the equation for drain current in (7.5),

–
–

(7.6)

Substituting for I1 and I2 in terms of the variable X defined in the previous section (2),

When the design is pre-charged, both the nodes A and B are pulled to the same potential. When
the pre-charge is removed, depending on the thermal noise at the gate of the two NMOS
transistors, either of the output is pulled down to “0”.
62

For the output of the TRNG (node B pulled down), the condition is

Expressing the equation in terms of X

(7.7)
Let Y =
Since both X1 and X2 are Gaussian random variables, Y which is a linear function of two
Gaussian random variables is also a Gaussian random variable with

Since all transistors in the ideal circuit are perfectly matched,

Substituting these values,

(7.8)
Hence,
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(7.9)
Hence, the bits generated by an ideal TRNG (0% mismatch in devices) follows a Gaussian
distribution with mean,

and variance,

.

In a non-ideal scenario where the two NMOS transistors are not matched either in size or
threshold voltage. Assuming that transistor N1 has a smaller channel length as compared to N2,

The probability of bit 0 is given by,

Since Y is a linear function of two random variables,

(7.10)
Therefore,

Similarly,

(7.11)
Substituting these values,
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Thus a mismatch in the transistor size leads to a shift in the distribution of bits generated by the
TRNG, away from the ideal distribution.
7.3 Probabilistic analysis of Metastability based TRNG considering process variation

For a NMOS transistor,

Assuming variation only in length and other parameters to be constant,

The length of the transistor, because of process variation has a Gaussian distribution with a mean μL and
2

variance σL .

Therefore,
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This also defines the Cumulative Distributive Function (CDF) of β.

(7.12)

The probability density function, PDF of β is the differential of the CDF. Hence, the PDF of β is
–

(7.13)
Now, considering the probability of bits “0” and “1”, as a function of transistor length (in terms of β),
from equation (5),

and

(7.14)

where,

and

Here, β1 and β2 are the “β” values of the two NMOS transistors.
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Integrating either P (bit = 0) or P (bit = 1) over the entire range of variation in length will result in
the expected values of each of the probability E [P (bit = 0)] and E [P (bit = 1)] to be equal to 0.5. This
does not provide any information about the effect of process variation. Hence, the bit entropy “H” as a
function of the length (or β1 and β2) provides a better relationship between the variation in length and the
randomness of the bits generated.

(7.15)
Since P (0) and P (1) are functions of “β”, the entropy “H” is also a function of “β” of the two transistors.
L1

High entropy
regions (Lengths
matched)

L2

Figure 53: Distribution of entropy with variation in length

The expected value of the entropy for a given process can be expressed as the following joint PDF,

(7.16)
where

is the joint PDF of the “β” values of the NMOS devices in the cross coupled inverters.
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Substituting for

from equations (7.14) and (7.15) respectively,

(7.17)
where,

Using the above expression and numerical methods to solve the same, the entropy of a TRNG
can be estimated for a given PDF of channel length (μL, σL2).

7.4 Analysis of post-processing techniques
A similar analysis can be extended to post-processing techniques as well to analyze the
effectiveness of the technique give the sigma variation in the process.
7.4.1 XOR Function
If XOR function is used as the post-processing technique, more than one TRNG circuits are used
to feed into the XOR gate. The following analysis assumes only 2 TRNGs feeding an XOR gate.
The probabilities of bits at the output of each TRNG is given by,
and
and
where P1 and P2 represent the probabilities of bits from each TRNG

68

At the output of the XOR gate,

The entropy as a function of lengths is given by,

The expected entropy is given by,

(7.18)

7.4.2 von Neumann corrector
The von Neumann corrector reads pairs of consecutive bits from the TRNG and outputs a
valid bit only if the bit pair has different polarities. At the output of the TRNG, the probability
of the bits are given from equation (7.14),
and
At the output of the von Neumann corrector,

Hence, P(0) = P(1) and theoretically the entropy of the output H = 1. The more significant
analysis of the von Neumann correction is the degradation in the output bit rate for varying
device mismatch.
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(7.19)
For an ideal TRNG,

and hence P(valid bit) = 1/4. This follows the ideal scenario. For a

biased TRNG, the expected bit rate is given by,

(7.20)

7.5 Implementation and Results
The stochastic model was implemented in MatLab. Stratified sampling technique was used to
analyze the TRNG circuit under various degree of on-chip variation. The length of the NMOS
devices was swept linearly from a value equal to -3σ to a value equal to +3σ. The entropy of the
TRNG was estimated based on the equation 7.14 and 7.15. The TRNG is affected more by the
relative variation in the pull down devices of the two inverters rather the absolute variation.
Hence, maximum entropy is observed when the devices are exactly matched and the entropy
decreases with increasing mismatch between the devices. The entropy distribution plot shows the
estimated entropy for variation in Leff of the NMOS devices in the two inverters. It can be
observed that an entropy of 1 is achieved whenever the Leff values of the two devices match. In
reality, the variation in Leff has a Gaussian distribution and hence the probability of a particular
value of Leff reduces as the sample moves away from the mean value of 17nm. As a result, the
estimated entropy was weighted based on the probability of the variation of length for a given
Gaussian distribution of N(µL, σ2L). This results in a weighted entropy distribution which is
dependent on the degree of Leff variation (σ2L).
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Figure 54: Distribution of entropy for variation in Leff

The weighted distribution of entropy for 3σ variation in Leff equal to 5% and 10% are shown in
figure 47 and figure 48. A larger sigma in variation of length results in a greater probability of
larger mismatch. In this case, the probability of a 5% mismatch in the two NMOS devices is
higher if 3σ equals 10% than when 3σ variation equals 5%. For a given process (ie. N(µL, σ2L) ),
the expected entropy is estimated as,
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Figure 55: Weighted distribution of bit-entropy (3-sig Leff variation = 5%)

Figure 56: Weighted distribution of bit-entropy (3-sig Leff variation = 10%)
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A similar analysis was extended to TRNG with XOR function and von Neumann correction as
post-processing The expected entropy plotted against different process corners (varying values of
σL) for a TRNG without correction and with post-processing techniques is as shown in fig 57.
The plot indicates that post-processing techniques provide efficient correction (with minimal
overhead in bit rate in case of von Neumann correction) for 3σ variation values around 2-3%.
Beyond this, the expected entropy starts to decrease and further correction or redundancy may be
required.
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Figure 57: Expected entropy/bit rate with different sigma variation in process

Thus, the stochastic model provides an estimate of the entropy for a given process. Although the
estimation lacks the accuracy of SPICE simulation which incorporates the various Short Channel
Effects (SCE), it provides a fair comparison of the entropy extraction mechanisms with
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significantly lower simulation effort. A comparison of the expected entropy values obtained from
the stochastic model and spice simulations is as shown in fig 58.
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Figure 58: Comparison of stochastic model with HSPICE simulation
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

On chip True Random Number Generators form a very critical part of cryptographic
applications. With advent in technology, the TRNG circuit efficiency is affected by a number of
factors like fabrication process, operating temperature and voltage. Traditional post-processing
techniques may not be sufficient to mitigate these variations and ensure randomness in the bits
generated.
In this thesis, a study of the effect of process variation on the bit entropy of metastability
based TRNG has been presented. A comparison of the traditional post-processing techniques
with circuit calibration mechanism shows that circuit level tuning provides better flexibility in
terms of correction and the energy overhead. Further, the effect of variation in operating
conditions has been discussed, which serve as a motivation to enhance the circuit calibration into
a self-calibration mechanism. A sub-vdd pre-charge technique is introduced to render the TRNG
circuit more tolerant to process variation. Pre-charging the TRNG to a voltage lesser than vdd
can provide upto 2X improvement in bit-entropy for worst case device mismatches with no
impact on the bit rate. A hybrid self-calibration technique is introduced using a combination of
one time circuit calibration for coarse calibration and continuous algorithmic entropy extraction
to compensate for finer mismatch. Different attack models were analyzed for a secure design of
TRNG. It was observed that an attacker can mount an active attack on the TRNG by gaining
control over global nets like supply and clock. Potential protection techniques were discussed to
secure the TRNG against attacks. Finally, a stochastic model for the TRNG has been presented
including a probabilistic analysis of TRNG in the presence of random process variation.
We acknowledge the support of NSF grant for “Ultra-wideband Radio for Low-Power
Security” and SRC funding for “Sub-45nm Circuit Design for True Random Number
Generation and Chip Identification” towards this work.

75

APPENDIX
SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT

One of the major challenges in simulation based research of TRNG is the development of
the simulation environment itself. A TRNG basically extracts randomness from a truly random
source, a source that cannot be modeled. Hence, results based on a simulation environment
cannot be expected to be as accurate as the actual hardware itself.
But, simulation based research provides flexibility to the researcher to study the behavior
of the circuit across a wide range of process parameters and operating conditions. Test chips
fabricated to validate designs come in few numbers. The sample is not big enough to observe
varied process variations, more so in works that rely heavily on the study of process variation.
Further, it is a complex process to analyze the chip under varied operating conditions like
temperature and voltage. Although the accuracy of the simulation results are limited by the
quality of the transistor models and the tool used for simulation, the results generally provide a
reasonable outlook to the behavior of the design under a varied set of constraints.
In the current work, HSPICE is used to simulate the circuit over a wide range of process
variation and operating temperature. The source of randomness, thermal noise is modeled using
the Gaussian function “GAUSS” in HSPICE. The methodology used here is based on the fact
that once the pre-charge on inputs of the cross-coupled inverters are released, both the inputs are
at the same potential of „vdd‟. But, depending on the differential thermal noise, one of the inputs
drives its corresponding NMOS to an ON state, thereby sinking the current and driving its output
to a state „0‟. Hence, it is the differential voltage above the pre-charge voltage that decides the
state of the TRNG.
To mimic this behavior, in the simulation model, each input of the cross-coupled inverter
is pre-charged to a different voltage at each cycle of the simulation. Since thermal noise is seen
to have a Gaussian distribution, the pre-charge signal is also modeled to have a Gaussian
distribution with a mean value equal to the „vdd‟ and a 3-σ variation of 50mV.
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Figure 59. TRNG circuit extracting randomness from thermal noise

GAUSS (vdd, 0.05, 3σ)

GAUSS (vdd, 0.05, 3σ)

vdd

vdd

Figure 60. TRNG circuit modelled in spice with varied pre-charge potential to mimic the effect of
thermal noise

Based on the mean and variance values specified, the HSPICE tool generates a sequence of data
that fits a Gaussian curve. But, since it is based on an algorithm, the random values generated are
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pseudo and not truly random. In other words, the data generated by the “GAUSS” function is
deterministic. But, from a simulation point of view, it is desirable that the given input matches
the expected noise distribution, but at the same time is repeatable over multiple runs. Hence, any
optimization made to the design can be verified using the same set of input data. Although the
“GAUSS” function in HSPICE basically generates deterministic bits, because of the Gaussian
distribution of data, the above methodology provides a fairly close model of true thermal noise.

Standard SPICE
netlist template for
TRNG

Variation in length
based on MonteCarlo simulation

Modify a copy of
the template
netlist with
variation in length

Random noise
voltage using the
“GAUSS” function

Run HSPICE
simulation for one
cycle with one
noise value

Perl based
platform to
perform bit/byte
entropy
calculation, run
length calculation
and key space
estiation

Figure 61. HSPICE and PERL based simulation platform for study of TRNG

The simulation platform built using PERL and encompassing HSPICE simulation setup is
as shown in figure 48.
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